Modulehackage-security-0.6.4.0Haskell2010
Hackage.Security.Trusted
- 6 types
- 1 class
- 10 values
- Packagehackage-security-0.6.4.0
- Exports17
- LanguageHaskell2010
- LicenceBSD-3-Clause
- SourceTCB.hs
Trust all elements of some trusted (traversable) container
If we have, say, a trusted list of values, we should be able to get a list of trusted values out of it.
trustElems :: Trusted [a] -> [Trusted a]NOTE. It might appear that the more natural primitive to offer is a sequenceA-like operator such as
trustSeq :: Applicative f => Trusted (f a) -> f (Trusted a)However, this is unsound. To see this, consider that ((->) a) is
Applicative (it's the reader monad); hence, we can instantiate trustSeq
at
trustSeq :: Trusted (a -> a) -> a -> Trusted aand by passing trustStatic (static id) make Trusted a functor, which we
certainly don't want to do (see comments for Trusted).
So why is it okay when we insist on Traversable rather than Applicative?
To see this, it's instructive to consider how we might make a ((->) a) an
instance of Traversable. If we define the domain of enumerable types as
class Eq a => Enumerable a where
enumerate :: [a]then we can make ((->) r) traversable by
instance Enumerable r => Traversable ((->) r) where
sequenceA f = rebuild <$> sequenceA ((\r -> (r,) <$> f r) <$> enumerate)
where
rebuild :: [(r, a)] -> r -> a
rebuild fun arg = fromJust (lookup arg fun)The idea is that if the domain of a function is enumerable, we can apply the function to each possible input, collect the outputs, and construct a new function by pairing the inputs with the outputs. I.e., if we had something of type
a -> IO band a is enumerable, we just run the IO action on each possible a and
collect all bs to get a pure function a -> b. Of course, you probably
don't want to be doing that, but the point is that as far as the type system
is concerned you could.
In the context of Trusted, this means that we can derive
enumPure :: Enumerable a => a -> Trusted abut in a way this this makes sense anyway. If a domain is enumerable, it
would not be unreasonable to change Enumerable to
class Eq a => Enumerable a where
enumerate :: [StaticPtr a]so we could define enumPure as
enumPure :: Enumerable a => a -> Trusted a
enumPure x = trustStatic
$ fromJust (find ((== x) . deRefStaticPtr) enumerate)In other words, we just enumerate the entire domain as trusted values (because we defined them locally) and then return the one that matched the untrusted value.
The conclusion from all of this is that the types of untrusted input (like the types of the TUF files we download from the server) should probably not be considered enumerable.
verifyFingerprints :: [KeyId]-> KeyThreshold-> TargetPathFor error messages
-> Signed Root-> Either VerificationError (SignaturesVerified Root)
Variation on verifyRole that uses key IDs rather than keys
This is used during the bootstrap process.
verifyRole' :: HasHeader a=> Trusted (RoleSpec a)For signature validation
-> TargetPathFile source (for error messages)
-> Maybe FileVersionPrevious version (if available)
-> Maybe UTCTimeTime now (if checking expiry)
-> Signed a-> Either VerificationError (SignaturesVerified a)
Role verification
NOTE: We throw an error when the version number _decreases_, but allow it to be the same. This is sufficient: the file number is there so that attackers cannot replay old files. It cannot protect against freeze attacks (that's what the expiry date is for), so "replaying" the same file is not a problem. If an attacker changes the contents of the file but not the version number we have an inconsistent situation, but this is not something we need to worry about: in this case the attacker will need to resign the file or otherwise the signature won't match, and if the attacker has compromised the key then he might just as well increase the version number and resign.
NOTE 2: We are not actually verifying the signatures _themselves_ here (we did that when we parsed the JSON). We are merely verifying the provenance of the keys.
A reference to a value of type a.
Root metadata updated (as part of the normal update process)
Instances3Show, Exception, Pretty
Show RootUpdatedDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCBException RootUpdatedDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCBPretty RootUpdatedDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCB
Trusted values
Trusted values originate in only two ways:
Anything that is statically known is trusted (trustStatic)
If we have "dynamic" data we can trust it once we have verified the the signatures (trustSigned).
NOTE: Trusted is NOT a functor. If it was we could define
trustAnything :: a -> Trusted a
trustAnything a = fmap (const a) (trustStatic (static ()))Consequently, it is neither a monad nor a comonad. However, we _can_ apply trusted functions to trusted arguments (trustApply).
The DeclareTrusted constructor is exported, but any use of it should be
verified.
Errors thrown during role validation
Constructors
VerificationErrorSignatures TargetPath Integer [KeyId] [KeyId]Not enough signatures signed with the appropriate keys
VerificationErrorExpired TargetPathThe file is expired
VerificationErrorVersion TargetPathThe file version is less than the previous version
VerificationErrorFileInfo TargetPathFile information mismatch
VerificationErrorUnknownTarget TargetPathWe tried to lookup file information about a particular target file, but the information wasn't in the corresponding
targets.jsonfile.VerificationErrorMissingSHA256 TargetPathThe metadata for the specified target is missing a SHA256
VerificationErrorDeserialization TargetPath DeserializationErrorSome verification errors materialize as deserialization errors
For example: if we try to deserialize a timestamp file but the timestamp key has been rolled over, deserialization of the file will fail with DeserializationErrorUnknownKey.
VerificationErrorLoop VerificationHistoryThe spec stipulates that if a verification error occurs during the check for updates, we must download new root information and start over. However, we limit how often we attempt this.
We record all verification errors that occurred before we gave up.
Instances3Show, Exception, Pretty
Show VerificationErrorDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCBException VerificationErrorDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCBPretty VerificationErrorDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted.TCB
Derived functions
1 declarationApply a static function to a trusted argument
Role verification
Methods
verifyRole :: Trusted Root -> TargetPath -> Maybe FileVersion -> Maybe UTCTime -> Signed a -> Either VerificationError (SignaturesVerified a)
Instances4VerifyRole
VerifyRole MirrorsDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.TrustedVerifyRole RootDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.TrustedVerifyRole SnapshotDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.TrustedVerifyRole TimestampDefined in hackage-security-0.6.4.0 · Hackage.Security.Trusted
File info verification
Variation on knownFileInfoEqual for Trusted FileInfo